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Abstract
Based on contingent claims analysis (CCA), this paper tries to esti-
mate the systemic risk build-up in the European Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU) countries using a market based measure “distance-
to-default” (DtD). It analyzes the individual and aggregated series for
a comprehensive set of banks in each eurozone country over the pe-
riod 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. Given the structural differences in financial
sector and banking regulations at national level, the indices provide a
useful indicator for monitoring country specific banking vulnerability
and stress. We find that average DtD indicators are intuitive, forward-
looking and timely risk indicators. The underlying trend, fluctuations
and correlations among indices help us analyze the interdependence
while cross-sectional differences in DtD prior to crisis suggest banking
sector fragility in peripheral EMU countries.
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1 Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt
crisis has exacerbated the need to understand and monitor the systemic
risk. The eurozone case is especially interesting given the diverse set of
countries and the nature of the European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU).
With the advent of euro, the EMU saw a rapid growth in the financial
sector fostered by the monetary policy convergence. But the structure of the
financial sector within countries has its own legacies and varies considerably.
In the case of Germany, Finland and the Netherlands, the total banking
assets are quite concentrated, while in Italy, Greece, France and Austria,
the assets are distributed quite equitably. Figure 1 suitably summarizes
this information by plotting the relative size of financial institutions (by
total assets) for all EMU countries, where the size of the biggest firm is
normalized to one.
Figure 1 Size distribution of banks in individual countries
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxembourg, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal. Datasource:
Bankscope
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In some countries, all financial services are only provided by banks, while
other have specialized mortgage banks, pension and insurance companies.
The economic dependence on financial sector and total assets managed also
varies drastically within EMU countries (Figure 2). Consider the case of
Luxembourg, where the total financial assets under management is roughly
twenty five times the GDP1 while, in Greece, Italy and Finland, this multiple
is less than three. Given the existence of deposit insurance at country level,
bank defaults can transfer huge contingent liabilities on sovereign’s balance
sheets.
Figure 2 MFI total assets as multiple of GDP
MFI: Monetary Financial Institution as classified by OECD. Datasource: OECD, National
Central Banks
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It is also important from the point of view of EMU structure. As banks
use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with the ECB but their gov-
ernments only partially back up any losses, in case the banks are unable
to repurchase the bonds. This can shift additional liability to sovereign’s
balance sheets in case of domestic bank failure. The banking regulation is
currently at the national level and governments have political incentives to
save domestic banks.
1Gross Domestic Product (at current prices)
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The basic idea of the paper is to take one structural market-based forward
looking indicator and gauge its performance in a cross sectional setting. This
basic risk indicator should: (1) identify the existing balance sheet mismatch;
(2) incorporate uncertainty using some forward looking market measure and
(3) provide quantifiable risk indicators to measure risk exposures (Gapen
et al. (2005)) It is possible, had regulators paid greater attention to these
country specific buildup of risk which this paper focuses, they might have
done better and earlier to mitigate the extent and impact of crisis.
We use data for a representative set of listed financial firms in each EMU
country from the end of 2004 till mid 2013, documenting the evolution of
one standard CCA market-based risk measure -“distance-to-default” (DtD)
- and examining its performance in cross-sectional econometric models of
sovereign and banking sector performance and their linkages. The central
questions addressed here are (i) does this systemic risk measure provide
useful information on the buildup of risk in financial sector?; (ii) does it
disentangle the structural differences in financial sector across countries?;
(iii) does there exist a strong interlink between sovereigns financial stress?;
(iv) does it provide useful insight about the market sentiments? and (v) can
it perform better as a forecasting indicator than regulatory and accounting
based measures of prudential risk?
As it turns out, DtD is a quite simple, convenient and intuitive forward look-
ing risk measure. The level of DtD does not extricate the countries based on
the structural differences in their financial sectors, but provides a good mea-
sure of inter-linkage. The market sentiments indicators are highly correlated
with DtD, but Granger causality test reveals no systemic component.
The contribution of this paper is four fold: (1) we use one of the most com-
prehensive representative databases for EMU financial sector; (2) the study
tries to understand the link between country specific buildup of systemic
risk with country specific market sentiments; (3) we are not neglecting the
banking sector of smaller countries, which may not be relevant at EMU level
but will be relevant at country level; and (4) this simple one-period contin-
gent claim model helps us understand the changes in capital structure of
banking sector which in turn will suggest the risk-shifting behavior of banks
and the readiness of sovereigns to stand sudden catastrophe.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature that
employs similar contingent claims framework to assess bank fragility and
buildup of systemic risk. Section 3 offers a detailed account of the method-
ology used to construct, analyze and interpret the DtD indicator. Section 4
describes the sample data and calibration of individual and aggregate DtD
series. Section 5 first documents the behavior of returns, volatility and
DtD for each EMU country. It then analyzes the joint behavior of returns,
volatility and DtD in the whole EMU financial sector and presents some
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cross-sectional econometric analysis to gauge the predictive ability of the
aggregate DtD indicator in measuring the build-up of financial stress and
market sentiments. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2 Literature survey
The traditional approach to assess the financial health of a firm has been
based on balance sheet based information. Certain accounting ratios were
identified that could measure and differentiate the financial well being of
firms (Altman (1968); Ohlson (1980); Zmijewski (1984)). These papers
typically employ multivariate discriminant analysis and multinomial choice
models to estimate the default probability. However the consensus on the
accuracy and prediction achieved is relatively low (see Altman and Katz
(1976); Kaplan and Urwitz (1979); Blume et al. (1998)). These models have
generally been criticized on three grounds: (1) the absence of a underlying
theoretical model; (2) the timeliness of information2 and (3) the lack of un-
certainty or forward looking component. The methodology also introduces
sample selection bias generating inconsistent coefficient estimates (Shumway
(2001); Chava and Jarrow (2004); Susan et al. (2012)).
The contingent claims model of Merton (1974) answers some of these crit-
icisms. It provides a structural underpinning and combines market-based
and accounting information to obtain a comprehensive set of company fi-
nancial risk indicators, e.g: DtD, probabilities of default, credit spreads, etc.
The basic model is based on the priority structure of balance sheet liabilities
and uses standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula to value the junior
claims as call option on firms’ value with the value of senior claims as default
barrier. It has been widely applied for assessing the ability of corporates,
banks and sovereigns to service their debt. Banking applications follow
CCA by interpreting a bank’s equity a call option on bank’s value given
the limited liability of shareholders. This approach was further refined by
Vasicek (1984) and Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is applied professionally
at Moody’s KMV to predict default.
Several papers have examined the usefulness of DtD as a tool for predicting
corporate and bank failure (Kealhofer (2003); Oderda et al. (2003); Vassalou
and Yuhang (2004); Gropp et al. (2006); Harada et al. (2010); Susan et al.
(2012)). They found DtD as a powerful measure to predict bankruptcy and
rating downgrades. In parallel, comparative analysis of accounting based
measures and DtD (Hillegeist et al. (2004) and Agarwal and Taffler (2008)),
2These models use financial statements information which are based on past perfor-
mance and are available only at either a quarterly or an annual frequency, thus fail to
capture changes in the financial conditions of the borrowing firm.
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suggest that the DtD can be a powerful proxy to determine default. Camp-
bell et al. (2008) and Bharath and Shumway (2008) incorporate a hazard
modeling approach using both accounting as well as market variables in their
estimation. They find that the DtD measure has relatively little explana-
tory power once they include other variables in their models. Campbell et al.
(2011) identify an alternative set of market measures such as price levels,
volatility of returns, equity to book ratio and profitability that enhance the
predictive power of the models to match real world probabilities of default.
Systemic risk and CCA
Systemic risk was first investigated in the early 1990s and since then it has
been the focus of many studies. OFR3 and De Bandt and Hartmann (2000)
provide a very comprehensive survey of the literature that addresses sys-
temic risk. The CCA approach has been widely cited and reviewed by the
IMF4, ECB and OFR as a tool to enhance systemic risk analysis. A num-
ber of applications of this approach have been studied to analyze different
dimensions of systemic risk.
This literature can be classified in three broad categories: (1) to define sys-
temic risk (Bartholomew and Whalen (2005); Goldstein (1995); Kaufman
(1995)); (2) to investigate what may cause changes in the level of systemic
risk, for example, changes in the level of inter-bank lending (Rochet and Ti-
role (1996)), financial system consolidation (De Nicolo and Kwast (2002)),
VaR - induced herding behavior in bank trading patterns (Jorion (2006)),
and the opaque and largely unregulated hedge funds (Chan et al. (2006);
Kambhu et al. (2007)) and (3) to develop systemic risk measures for mon-
itoring purposes. We intend to advance the third strand of literature with
our current study. This approach will help supplement the existing method-
ologies that failed to capture vulnerabilities prior to this crisis.
In practice, the extension of DtD series as system wide indicator suffer two
major issues: (1) how individual banks data can be aggregated as system
wide representation and (2) at what level they should be aggregated? We
follow Harada and Ito (2008) and Harada et al. (2010) which provided empir-
ical evidence of DtD usefulness to detect bank default risks. The systemic
risk indicator in this case was an average of individual DtD series. This
approach offers relative risk measures and is very attractive in terms of pol-
icy advise. However, this aggregation method ignores the joint distribution
properties. In Gray et al. (2007), Gray and Jobst (2010), Duggar and Mi-
tra (2007), Gray et al. (2010) and Gray and Jobst (2013)), authors provide
further extensions to incorporate inter-linkages using rolling correlations or
extreme value theory and developed extensions to analyze a wide range of
3Office of Financial Research, US Treasury
4International Monetary Fund
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macro-financial issues. This paper will remain silent on these issues. Instead
we will try to investigate the linkages based on the weighted and unweighted
average DtD indicators.
In recent literature, Gray and Malone (2008) and Saldias (2013) have argued
that option based volatility can improve the performance of DtD and over-
come some of the shortcomings originated in its assumptions on the returns
distributions. Given that we want to discriminate the banking structure
among EMU countries, we will shy away from using index volatility. Instead,
we will construct our own measure of volatility based on historical returns
series for each country. This ignores information based on index options
(future correlations and skews) but is more appropriate for our analysis.
3 Contingent claim analysis
Contingent claim analysis has its genesis in Merton’s general derivative pric-
ing model (Merton (1974)) in a framework that combines market based and
balance sheet information to obtain a set of financial risk indicators. In this
context, the liabilities are viewed as contingent claims against assets with
payoff determined by seniority. Since equity has limited liability and has the
residual claim on the assets after all other obligations have been met, it be-
comes an implicit call option on the market value of assets with strike price
defined by the debt barrier. Figure 3 shows this relationship graphically.
Figure 3 Equity as call option
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To understand the key relationship between the value of total assets and
the promised payments, Figure 4 plots the probability distribution of assets
value at time t1 assuming that the asset return process is dA/A = µAdt +
σA
√
(t), where µA is the drift rate or asset return, σA is equal to the
standard deviation of the asset return, and  is normally distributed, with
zero mean and unit variance. Default occurs when assets fall to or below
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the promised payments. The probability that the assets value will be below
the promised payments is the area below the promised payments and is the
“actual” default probability.
But the asset-return probability distribution used to value contingent claims
is not the “actual” one but the “risk-adjusted” or “risk-neutral” probabil-
ity distribution, which substitutes the risk-free interest rate for the actual
expected return in the distribution. This risk-neutral distribution is the
dashed line in Figure 4 with expected rate of return r, the risk-free rate.
Thus, the “risk-adjusted” probability of default calculated using the “risk-
neutral” distribution is larger than the actual probability of default for all
assets which have an actual expected return (µ) greater than the risk-free
rate r (that is, a positive risk premium).
Figure 4 Risk-adjusted probability of default
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3.1 Derivation of individual DtD
Given this background, DtD cannot be measured directly. Rather it is recov-
ered implicitly from observed measures of bank liabilities and of the market
prices of those liabilities. Since equity is a junior claim to debt, the former
can be modeled and calculated as a standard call option on the assets with
exercise price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the literature
as distress barrier or default barrier).
E = max(0, A−D) (1)
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian Mo-
tion, the application of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula
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(Black and Scholes (1973)) yields the closed-form expression of equity E as
an European call option on the bank’s assets A at maturity T:
E = AN(d1)− e−rTDN(d2) (2)
where r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, and N(∗) is the cumulative
normal distribution. The values of d1 and d2 are expressed as
d1 =
ln(AD ) + (r + 0.5σ
2
A)T
σA
√
T
(3)
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T (4)
We use an additional equation that links the asset volatility σA to the volatil-
ity of the bank’s equity σE by applying Ito’s Lemma:
σE =
A
E
σAN(d1) (5)
The Merton model uses Eqs. 2 and 5 to obtain the implied asset value A and
volatility σA , which are not observable and must be estimated by inverting
the two relationships. Once a numerical solutions for A and σA are found,
the DtD is calculated as:
DtD =
VA −D
σAVA
(6)
Using this model to quantify DtD requires some practical compromises.
Real debt contracts are not all written with a single terminal date. To
overcome this problem, a common procedure used by Moody’s KMV and
also employed here, is to adopt a one year horizon T, but to weight longer
term debt of maturity greater than one year at only 50% of face value.
We also use the market value of firms’ equity, average quarterly historical
volatilities as equity price return volatility and 10-year government bond
yields as the risk-free interest rate.
3.2 Sensitivity of DtD
DtD can be interpreted as how many standard deviations the asset value of
the firm is away from the debt of the firm. Three key inputs to calculating
the DtD for a firm are market capitalization, debt level, and the volatility
of equity. This implies that the DtD is influenced by the leverage ratio and
volatility of the firm. A lower value of DtD can be obtained either because
the leverage of the firm is high or because the volatility is high or both.
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Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of DtD to each of these inputs across varying
levels of leverage and equity volatility.
It should be noted that when overall market volatility is high, it is likely
that even small changes in the leverage will cause large changes in the DtD.
Thus, in episodes of distress when systemic volatility reached peak levels, the
DtD react much more sharply to even small changes in leverage. Whereas
the same amount of change during calm period would decrease DtD slightly
(Susan et al. (2012)).
Figure 5 Sensitivity of distance-to-default
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4 Data
This section introduces the bank sample used to compute the individual firm
specific and aggregate country specific DtD time series. For the analysis, we
will consider countries which share the common currency Euro from the very
start (1999) except for Greece which joined in 2001. This choice will ensure
that the selected banks share the same accounting currency. It doesn’t mean
that they have similar exchange rate risk profile since the level of foreign
currency exposure will depend on the asset profile of their respective banks.
4.1 The sample
The sample used to compute the DtD and aggregate DtD series is based on
all monetary financial institutions listed in EMU countries. This includes
all monetary firms whose share are publicly listed and traded between the
last quarter of 2004 till the second quarter of 2013. We have also considered
firms which got listed/delisted in the reference period. The idea is to create
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a comprehensive list of institutions which can be used as one of the best
reference of the European financial sector covering almost all dimensions of
European banking integration in terms of systemic risk and for the purpose
of this research.
The data selection methodology is as follows: Firstly, an exhaustive list of
all listed/delisted financial institution are selected from Bankscope which
provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for banking companies. We
got a total of 199 firms in western Europe. Secondly, banks based in coun-
tries which are not part of this study have been dropped out. Thirdly, we
removed credit institutions which are pure-play insurance, pension or mort-
gage banks. To formalize this decision, we have used Datastream as an
additional source of information. Finally, firms which got listed, delisted,
nationalized or suffered any other relevant corporate actions have been con-
sidered in the data set till they stopped trading at public exchanges.
Table 1 summarizes the list of countries and total number of banks consid-
ered for the DtD analysis. One should note that due to the varying number
of bankruptcy, M&A, nationalization or other corporate actions, the num-
ber of firms in the sample will change year-on-year, both for the full sample
and for each individual country (Figure 6). The comprehensive list of firms
used in this analysis is summarized in Table 2. The period for which each
firm got traded is also available but is not documented to save space. This
information is available upon request.
Table 1 Countries and banks considered for the analysis
Country Year of joining the Euro No. of Banks Selected
Austria 1999 3
Belgium 1999 2
Germany 1999 15
Spain 1999 9
Finland 1999 3
France 1999 21
Greece 2001 7
Ireland 1999 5
Italy 1999 22
Netherlands 1999 6
Portugal 1999 5
Total 98
Table 2 List of banks (by country)
Name Status ISIN
Austria
UniCredit Bank Austria AG Delisted AT0000995006
Erste Group Bank AG Listed AT0000652011
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Listed AT0000606306
Germany
Continued on next page
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Name Status ISIN
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG Delisted DE0008023227
Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG Delisted DE0008076001
UniCredit Bank AG Delisted DE0008022005
Oldenburgische Landesbank Listed DE0008086000
Deutsche Postbank AG Listed DE0008001009
UmweltBank AG Listed DE0005570808
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG Delisted DE0008027707
HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG Listed DE0008115106
Deutsche Bank AG Listed DE0005140008
Commerzbank AG Listed DE000CBK1001
Wustenrot & Wurttembergische Listed DE0008051004
Comdirect Bank AG Listed DE0005428007
Net-M Privatbank 1891 AG Delisted DE0008013400
Merkur-Bank KGaA Listed DE0008148206
Quirin Bank AG Listed DE0005202303
Spain
Banco Santander SA Listed ES0113900J37
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Listed ES0113211835
Caixabank, S.A. Listed ES0140609019
Bankia, SA Listed ES0113307021
Banco de Sabadell SA Listed ES0113860A34
Banco Popular Espanol SA Listed ES0113790226
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM Listed ES0114400007
Bankinter SA Listed ES0113679I37
Renta 4 Banco, S.A. Listed ES0173358039
France
Credit Agricole Sud Rhone Alpes Listed FR0000045346
Paris Orleans SA Listed FR0000031684
Credit Agricole de la Touraine et du Poitou Listed FR0000045304
Credit Agricole Alpes Provence Listed FR0000044323
Credit Agricole Nord de France Listed FR0000185514
Credit Agricole d’Ile-de-France Listed FR0000045528
Credit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire Listed FR0000045239
Credit Industriel et Commercial Listed FR0005025004
Banque Tarneaud Delisted FR0000065526
Credit agricole mutuel de Normandie-Seine Listed FR0000044364
Credit Agricole Mutuel du Languedoc Listed FR0010461053
Natixis Listed FR0000120685
Credit Agricole de l’Ille-et-Vilaine Listed FR0000045213
Credit Agricole d’Aquitaine Delisted FR0000044547
Societe Generale Listed FR0000130809
Credit Agricole S.A. Listed FR0000045072
BNP Paribas Listed FR0000131104
Boursorama Listed FR0000075228
Credit Agricole du Morbihan Listed FR0000045551
Credit Agricole Brie Picardie Listed FR0010483768
Societe Alsacienne de Dveloppement et d’Expansion Delisted FR0000124315
Belgium
Dexia Listed BE0003796134
KBC Groep NV Listed BE0003565737
Finland
Pohjola Bank Plc Listed FI0009003222
Continued on next page
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Name Status ISIN
Aktia Bank Plc Listed FI4000058870
Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland Plc Listed FI0009001127
Ireland
Depfa Bank Plc Delisted IE0072559994
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited-IBRC Delisted IE00B06H8J93
Permanent TSB Plc Delisted IE0004678656
Bank of Ireland Listed IE0030606259
Allied Irish Banks plc Listed IE0000197834
Italy
UniCredit SpA Listed IT0004781412
Intesa Sanpaolo Listed IT0000072618
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Listed IT0001334587
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa Listed IT0003487029
Banco Popolare - Societa Coop. Listed IT0004231566
Mediobanca SpA Listed IT0000062957
Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna Listed IT0000066123
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL Listed IT0000064482
Banca Carige SpA Listed IT0003211601
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Coop. per Azioni Listed IT0000784196
Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM Listed IT0003121677
Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop Listed IT0000064516
Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio Soc. coop. Listed IT0004919327
Credito Bergamasco Listed IT0000064359
Banco di Sardegna SpA Listed IT0001005070
Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA Listed IT0001041000
Banca Ifis SpA Listed IT0003188064
Banca Generali SpA Listed IT0001031084
Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni Listed IT0000074077
Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA Listed IT0001007209
Banca Profilo SpA Listed IT0001073045
Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA Listed IT0000088853
The Netherlands
SNS Reaal NV Delisted NL0000390706
RBS Holdings NV Delisted NL0000301109
ING Groep NV Listed NL0000303600
Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group Listed NL0009294552
Van Lanschot NV Listed NL0000302636
BinckBank NV Listed NL0000335578
Portugal
Montepio Holding SGPS SA Delisted PTFNB0AM0005
Banco Comercial Portugues, SA Listed PTBCP0AM0007
Banco Espirito Santo SA Listed PTBES0AM0007
Banco BPI SA Listed PTBPI0AM0004
BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA Listed PTBAF0AM0002
4.2 Calibration of DtD series
To compute individual DtD, we used information on the risk-free rate, the
market value of equity, and short-term liability (book value). Default bar-
rier was calculated as the sum of 100% of deposits and short term debt and
12
Figure 6 No of banks used every period for each country
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50% of long term liability. Daily share price data and number of shares for
each firm were downloaded from Datastream, and used to compute market
capitalization and volatility. Volatility was calculated as the standard devi-
ation of logarithmic returns for the past 66 trading days (3 months) prior to
each accounting date. Share prices and interest rates were all downloaded
in the currency used by each bank for its annual reporting.
Calculations of distance to default were made on a quarterly basis. While
most of the institutions report their numbers quarterly, many other institu-
tions only reported on a half-yearly basis for most of the period 2004−2013.
To have data consistency, balance sheet variables are interpolated for inter-
mediate dates using cubic splines. The list of variable used for the analysis
are summarized in Table 3.
4.3 Aggregating DtD series
The unweighted average DtD (aDtD) is obtained by taking the simple aver-
age across all credit institutions headquartered in a particular country and
is computed as:
aDtDt = (1/N)
N∑
j=1
DtDj,t (7)
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Table 3 Description of variables
Balance sheet variables
Variable Definition Source
Total assets As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope
(Code 2025)
Short-term liabilities Deposits and short term funding Bankscope
(Code 2030)
Total equity As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope
(Code 2055)
Daily market based variables
Variable Definition Source
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of country
where the bank headquarter is based
Thomson
Datastream
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by to-
tal outstanding share in public
Thomson
Datastream
where DtDj,t is the DtD of firm j at time t .
The aggregate weighted average DtD (wDtD) is based on the market cap-
ital weighted average of DtD for all credit institutions headquartered in a
particular country and is represented as:
wDtDt =
N∑
j=1
wj,tDtDj,t (8)
where DtDj,t is thel DtD of firm j and wj,t is the individual market-capital
weights at time t.
5 Analysis
To put the data into perspective, we summarize the behavior of returns,
volatility and DtD at country level for all EMU countries under study. Fig-
ure 7 plots the index level based on average logarithmic returns of all firms in
the sample for a particular country. Firms which dropped out (due to some
corporate action) during a particular quarter have been removed from the
average calculations at the next period. This methodology creates an up-
ward bias in the returns index level and should be interpreted carefully. To
check the variation in data, Figure 8 shows the evolution of market capital-
ization weighted returns index at country level. Both indices are normalized
to 100 for all countries at the end of the third quarter in 2004.
The returns level suggests that the indices have fallen very substantially
for all countries. The first period of rapid decline started around mid 2007
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but saw some recovery during 2009. The second period of decline started
during the sovereign debt crisis at the end of 2009 which still continues for
some countries. For half of the sample, the index level at the end of 2012
is below the index value in 2004. Greece, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and
Italy witnessed the highest drop while Finland and Austria sailed quietly. In
some countries (like Portugal and Ireland) the index level shows a dramatic
recovery post crisis. These spikes are because of the sudden drop in sample
size due to firms failures and hence is more exaggerated for small countries.
Figure 7 Average index return
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and
Monetary Union
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Figure 9 presents unweighted equity price volatility5 aggregated at coun-
try level for all EMU countries under study. As can be seen, the market
volatility was quite stable till mid 2008 but saw a knee jerk reaction once
Lehman Brothers collapsed. Interestingly, the price decline started from
the beginning of 2008 but the market volatility remained stable. Some of
the countries (Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Greece and the Nether-
lands) saw huge spikes, while the peripheral countries registered a relatively
calm period. One possible reason of the excess volatility may be the higher
integration and exposure to international financial markets.
5 The volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of previous 66 days daily loga-
rithmic returns and is annualized by multiplying it with
√
252.
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Figure 8 Market capital weighted index returns
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Table 4 Summary statistics - Average returns volatility
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and
Monetary Union
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
AT 20.89 26.84 30.94 42.19 48.56 127.90
BE 13.40 21.89 40.66 56.83 79.71 203.90
ES 12.01 18.72 26.34 30.59 41.59 63.79
DE 19.06 25.92 30.58 34.51 36.65 87.09
FI 12.92 19.53 26.36 28.39 33.06 60.04
FR 15.07 19.85 23.93 27.30 34.99 52.87
GR 19.55 30.86 56.57 59.68 75.66 150.60
IE 15.55 22.65 69.49 75.61 102.20 220.80
IT 12.81 21.39 28.01 31.12 40.66 56.91
NL 16.96 23.67 27.86 35.08 43.72 90.09
PT 11.86 20.69 31.57 33.16 46.27 69.39
EMU 17.82 23.15 37.77 41.31 54.94 88.72
Average volatility level of small countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the
Netherlands and Austria) are relatively high in general. Table 4 provides
the summary statistics for average volatility at country level. Post 2009,
the volatility dropped for most EMU countries but has not yet reached its
16
Figure 9 Average returns volatility
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
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pre-crisis level. European sovereign debt crisis and loss of market confidence
may be some possible explanation why the average volatility in peripheral
countries remains relatively high. The shift in the mean volatility level also
need to be interpreted cautiously. Analysis based on market capitalization
weighted volatility suggests similar findings.
Figure 10 show the behavior of unweighted and weighted average DtD for
each country while Table 5 reports the summary statistics. It should be
noted that average level of DtD is quite low for Greece and Ireland which
suggests their vulnerability to sudden and unexpected shocks. Any increase
in market volatility will lead to insolvency very fast. Together these series
show a downward trend from 2004 till 2009 and then stay at the same level.
Given that the returns started collapsing at the start of 2008 and volatility
was quite stable till mid 2008, this plots suggest that DtD might be a leading
indicator of distress.
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Figure 10 aDtD and wDtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
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Table 5 Summary statistics - aDtD and wDtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and
Monetary Union
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
aDtD
AT 0.78 2.00 2.90 2.98 3.97 5.59
BE 0.69 1.53 2.46 3.25 4.59 8.23
ES 2.00 3.07 4.42 4.58 5.54 8.50
DE 1.31 3.14 3.89 3.80 4.38 6.42
FI 1.80 3.35 3.88 4.34 5.42 8.68
FR 2.27 3.33 4.71 4.63 5.67 7.05
GR 0.81 1.38 1.87 2.35 3.40 5.28
IE 0.49 1.15 1.75 2.69 4.51 7.50
IT 1.97 2.87 3.89 4.20 5.57 7.72
NL 1.49 2.74 3.98 3.83 4.77 6.40
PT 1.45 2.23 3.21 3.96 5.32 9.58
EMU 1.52 2.59 3.49 3.69 4.81 6.32
wDtD
AT 0.80 1.69 2.79 2.92 4.04 5.79
BE 0.68 1.70 2.72 2.93 3.51 7.38
ES 1.29 2.61 3.36 4.04 5.46 8.23
DE 0.88 2.34 3.22 3.11 3.86 5.97
FI 1.37 2.56 3.60 3.71 4.59 6.62
FR 1.16 1.70 2.89 2.88 3.62 6.15
GR 0.70 1.29 1.78 2.27 3.19 4.95
IE 0.41 1.01 1.71 2.48 4.33 5.74
IT 0.17 1.69 2.75 2.79 3.38 9.87
NL 0.81 2.10 3.12 3.67 4.42 12.12
PT 1.44 2.08 3.30 3.67 4.15 11.00
EMU 1.10 2.06 3.05 3.13 3.87 6.70
5.1 Preliminary results
To visualize aDtD as a potential indicator of future financial stress, we
examine the variation in aDtD with the broad market indicators of returns
and volatility. Figure 11-12 plot aDtD, average returns and average volatility
for each EMU country. The left axis represents the returns index level while
the right axis represents the annualized volatility in percentage. The level
of aDtD is scaled to show the general trend and variation with time.
The graphs suggest that aDtD started deteriorating for most countries be-
tween 2006-07, except for France and the Netherlands. It should be noted
that aDtD started declining when average returns were showing an upward
trend. It also indicates very strong correlations with the average volatil-
ity which does undermine its predictive ability. A similar graph based on
weighted indices suggests analogous findings, which encourages us to test its
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predictive ability.
Figure 11 Country-wise indices
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France.
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Figure 12 Country-wise indices
Greece, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union.
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5.2 Correlations
We use three correlations measures (parametric: Pearson, and non-parametric:
Spearman and Kendell) in our analysis to avoid any bias rising from poten-
tial non-linear dependencies and to ascertain the robustness of our findings.
Since the Pearson measure is the most commonly used, we report our find-
ings based on Pearson correlations only, but they are also robust based on
the Spearman and Kendell correlations as well.
For each correlations measure, we first estimate the pair-wise correlations
among all the aggregated sovereign DtD series (Table 6) and then take the
mean and median of these pair correlations to obtain some inferences. The
average correlation among indices is very high which suggests a common
risk factor. This may also be because of the small sample that contains
two crisis episodes. To understand the time varying correlation dynamics,
a sighed rank test is applied to test the null hypothesis that the mean and
median correlations are equal if we divide the time period in two half (pre
and post crisis). The results remain consistent for varying sample periods.
Table 6 Correlations among aDtD and wDtD indices
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and
Monetary Union
aDtD
Country AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU
AT 1.00 0.83 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.88 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.79 0.77 0.91
BE 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.66 0.63 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.84 0.79 0.84 0.95
ES 0.70 0.83 1.00 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.72 0.86 0.75 0.65 0.73 0.87
DE 0.79 0.66 0.65 1.00 0.78 0.75 0.51 0.62 0.81 0.69 0.58 0.80
FI 0.71 0.63 0.66 0.78 1.00 0.62 0.53 0.63 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.77
FR 0.88 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.62 1.00 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.70 0.86
GR 0.74 0.89 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.69 1.00 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.88 0.88
IE 0.78 0.93 0.86 0.62 0.63 0.74 0.84 1.00 0.78 0.71 0.77 0.92
IT 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.78 1.00 0.80 0.84 0.93
NL 0.79 0.79 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.71 0.80 1.00 0.67 0.85
PT 0.77 0.84 0.73 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.88 0.77 0.84 0.67 1.00 0.88
EMU 0.91 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.85 0.88 1.00
wDtD
Country AT BE ES DE FI FR GR IE IT NL PT EMU
AT 1.00 0.80 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.62 0.68 0.77 0.51 0.33 0.69 0.85
BE 0.80 1.00 0.74 0.65 0.51 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.64 0.77 0.95
ES 0.75 0.74 1.00 0.62 0.71 0.38 0.82 0.92 0.23 0.45 0.64 0.83
DE 0.77 0.65 0.62 1.00 0.78 0.51 0.60 0.60 0.45 0.40 0.51 0.76
FI 0.73 0.51 0.71 0.78 1.00 0.31 0.48 0.63 0.15 0.30 0.45 0.66
FR 0.62 0.83 0.38 0.51 0.31 1.00 0.46 0.43 0.88 0.56 0.66 0.76
GR 0.68 0.79 0.82 0.60 0.48 0.46 1.00 0.84 0.43 0.61 0.69 0.85
IE 0.77 0.80 0.92 0.60 0.63 0.43 0.84 1.00 0.32 0.49 0.65 0.85
IT 0.51 0.74 0.23 0.45 0.15 0.88 0.43 0.32 1.00 0.52 0.74 0.69
NL 0.33 0.64 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.56 0.61 0.49 0.52 1.00 0.46 0.69
PT 0.69 0.77 0.64 0.51 0.45 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.74 0.46 1.00 0.84
EMU 0.85 0.95 0.83 0.76 0.66 0.76 0.85 0.85 0.69 0.69 0.84 1.00
5.3 Market returns and DtD during the crisis
Figure 13 summarizes the behavior of country specific returns and of ag-
gregate DtD during the financial crisis. As a potential indicator of future
22
financial stress, we examine the possibility by comparing the cumulative re-
turns from 2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2 to 2009Q1 with the fall in DtD. As this
makes clear, most of the fall in DtD was between 2007-Q2 and 2008-Q2
which shows a direct and obvious prediction of vulnerability prior to the
crisis. On the other hand, the total drop in returns shows no correlation
with the drop in DtD.
Figure 13 Cumulative returns vs DtD
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and
Monetary Union
2007-Q2 to 2009-Q1
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
−3.5 −3.0 −2.5 −2.0 −1.5 −1.0
−
30
0
−
25
0
−
20
0
−
15
0
−
10
0
Change in DtD
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 re
tur
ns
AT
BE
ES
DE FI
FR
GR
IE
IT
NL
PTEMU
2008-Q2 to 2009-Q1
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
−
18
0
−
16
0
−
14
0
−
12
0
−
10
0
−
80
−
60
Change in DtD
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 re
tur
ns
AT
BE
ES
DE
FI FR
GR
IE
IT
NL
PT
EMU
23
When we look at the initial level of DtD with the drop in DtD during the
crisis (Figure 14), the relationship seems to be positive. This suggests that
the higher level of DtD experiences a relatives higher correction during this
period. The average level of DtD for most EMU countries was around four.
For a subset of countries - Austria, France and Italy - DtD fell quite sharply
between 2007-Q2 and 2009-Q1. While for Portugal, Spain and Greece, the
corrections were less than expected.
Figure 14 Scatter plot with trend line
AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, DE: Germany, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR: Greece,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, EMU: European Economic and
Monetary Union
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6 Conclusion
By analyzing the behavior and fluctuations of a market based indicator
for individual EMU countries, we find that average DtD is an intuitive,
simple and convenient forward looking systemic risk measure. It shows
some predictive ability 12-18 months prior to the global financial crisis for
most of the countries and captures the trend as well as fluctuations in the
financial markets. Moreover, it also presents very strong correlations with
quarterly average historical volatility which undermines its usefulness.
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The average level of risk measure suggests some cross sectional differences
across the financial industry. The average DtD indicator shows synchronized
movements in all countries with very strong correlations, which suggests the
existence of common risk factors across EMU countries. The sudden dip in
average DtD for countries during time of stress can be explained by increased
global volatility.
To conclude, there are various reasons for considering structural market
based indicators alongside accounting/regulatory risk measure. As statisti-
cal theory suggests, when faced with two estimators for the same underlying
variable, it is optimal to combine the two. Tracking country specific indices
does provide some additional information related with the average risk level
and the ability to withstand sudden and unexpected disruptions.
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